When an algorithm chooses the embryo. The ethics of embryo selection using AI

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47133/respy43-25-2-2a-10

Keywords:

Artificial Intelligence (AI), embryo selection, Ethics, In vitro fertilization (IVF), reproductive technology

Abstract

In the field of in vitro fertilization (IVF), artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used to select embryos for transfer. This article explores the ethical implications of using AI in embryo selection, discussing two main models: one based on the preferences and values of prospective parents and another based on parameters set by programmers or healthcare professionals. The ethical challenges of both models are examined, including the potential for increased social inequality, the dehumanization of reproduction, and concerns about parental responsibilities. The article also considers the implications of a future in which AI could choose embryos from a large population, raising questions about the nature of parental love and social views on enhancement. Finally, it assesses whether AI-assisted embryo selection could exacerbate social injustices compared to genomic editing interventions, suggesting the need for careful ethical oversight in reproductive technologies.

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Author Biographies

Maurizio Balistreri, Universidad de Tuscia, Viterbo, Italia.

Associate Professor of Moral Philosophy (M-Fil/03) at DISTU, University of Tuscia. He previously served as Fixed-Term Researcher in the Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences at the University of Turin (2013-2021). He holds the National Scientific Qualification as Associate Professor in Moral Philosophy (sector 11/C3), obtained in 2014 and renewed in 2019. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Philosophy from the University of Rome "La Sapienza" (1994), with a grade of 110/110 cum laude. PhD in Philosophy from the University of Rome "La Sapienza".

José Manuel Silvero, Universidad Nacional de Asunción, Asunción, Paraguay.

Bachelor's degree in Philosophy (UNA) and PhD in Philosophy (University of Oviedo, Spain). He holds diplomas in Advanced Studies in Philosophy (Oviedo) and in Social Inclusion Policies (IMF-CIRF, Rome). He completed postdoctoral fellowships at the University of Lisbon, CIALC-UNAM (Mexico), and the Bruno Kessler Foundation (Italy). Level I Categorized Researcher (PRONII-CONACYT). Member of the boards of CONEC, ANEAES, and CONACYT. Professor in master's and doctoral programs.

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Published

2025-12-28

How to Cite

Maurizio Balistreri, & José Manuel Silvero. (2025). When an algorithm chooses the embryo. The ethics of embryo selection using AI. ESTUDIOS PARAGUAYOS , 43(2), 258–278. https://doi.org/10.47133/respy43-25-2-2a-10

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Original articles